who wins?

same votes. three methods. three different winners.

your class of 12 is picking the party food. here are the ballots.

5 voters
1. 🍕 pizza
2. 🌮 tacos
3. 🍣 sushi
4 voters
1. 🍣 sushi
2. 🌮 tacos
3. 🍕 pizza
3 voters
1. 🌮 tacos
2. 🍣 sushi
3. 🍕 pizza
method 1: plurality

whoever gets the most first-choice votes wins.

🍕 pizza
5
🍣 sushi
4
🌮 tacos
3
🍕 pizza wins

pizza wins with just 5 out of 12 first-choice votes. 7 students wanted something else.

method 2: ranked choice (instant runoff)

eliminate the option with fewest first-choice votes. give those voters' next choice their vote. repeat until someone has a majority.

round 1
🍕 pizza
5
🍣 sushi
4
🌮 tacos
3

🌮 tacos eliminated (fewest first-choice votes). those 3 voters had sushi second.

round 2
🍣 sushi
4 + 3 = 7
🍕 pizza
5
🍣 sushi wins with majority (7 of 12)

same ballots. completely different winner.

method 3: borda count

give points by ranking: 2 for first, 1 for second, 0 for third. most points wins.

🍕 pizza: (5×2) + (4×0) + (3×0) = 10
🌮 tacos: (5×1) + (4×1) + (3×2) = 15
🍣 sushi: (5×0) + (4×2) + (3×1) = 11
🌮 tacos
15 pts
🍣 sushi
11 pts
🍕 pizza
10 pts
🌮 tacos wins

three methods. three winners. zero ballots changed.

same ballots. three winners.

plurality
🍕
pizza
ranked choice
🍣
sushi
borda count
🌮
tacos

every method seems fair. every method gives a different answer.

in 1951, kenneth arrow proved this is unavoidable. no voting system with three or more options can satisfy all of these at once:

  1. if every voter prefers A over B, the group should too
  2. the A vs B ranking should not depend on how voters feel about C
  3. no single voter should be able to dictate the outcome

this is arrow's impossibility theorem. every voting system is a tradeoff.

generate random elections and see how often the three methods agree